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The “9/11” Decade: Rethinking Reality

Paper Abstracts

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Mourning and its ethical investment in Judith Butler’s *Precarious Life*: Reappraising the politics of grief post-September 11

Judith Butler’s *Precarious Life: the Powers of Mourning and Violence* (2004) is a response to U.S. military violence and retribution in the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon on September 11th 2001. For this work it is through an ethical response to the experience of suffering, so powerfully exemplified in mourning, that there emerges the possibility for just such a response to the vulnerability of grief itself: Not ‘a cry for war’, but recognition of its political implications for ‘our’ international ties – relationality.

Of *Precarious Life* I make three claims

- 1) The ‘unbearable vulnerability’ of grief is deployed by Butler as an ethical investment and political resource; grief is to be tarried in the face of an-other’s death, because mourning is endowed with this beneficial quality, and consequent gains.
- 2) Mourning emerges as that which both usefully *calls for* responsibility and is *itself* this very call; a distinction itself replicating the political divide between public and private mourning.

- 3) Butler's utilisation of grief to awaken the political community to certain relational ties of fundamental dependency and ethical responsibility is underpinned by its very privatisation. Inextricably tied to those deaths from which modern societies draw sustenance privatised mourning forms the constitutive outside of any such political community.

The paradox produced by the privatisation of mourning is how for modern societies grief undoes the individual, *as such*. The bereaved become those whose restitution and recovery is hindered by their sense of loss in virtue of their relational ties to the dead person. For Butler, I show, grief thus confers a *dispossessed* relationality, exemplified psychoanalytically, by the individual's narcissistic hold onto the lost object, a (national) melancholic refusal to acknowledge its constitutive outside.

My paper argues that an ethically realized (national) public recognition of grievable human lives is *politically* circumscribed through the privatisation of mourning. This Butler fails to address: the precariousness of de/politicised grief; its violent biopolitical conditions of emergence. For what Nikolas Rose (1998) refers to as the 'psy' disciplines are, I suggest, tied in positive relation to deaths materiality and deployment, as they fix upon the bereaved person's relation to the dead.

References

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Michael Asante, Koforidua Polytechnic, Ghana

Theorising resistance: Rethink law, rethinking politics

We have recently lived through our own "great disturbance." September 11 was not at least, not yet as transformative an event as World War II. Yet it undoubtedly will lead historians to rethink how we study and teach the American past. This, indeed, is as it should be. All history, the saying goes, is contemporary history. The past forty years have demonstrated how people instinctively turn to the past to help understand the present and how events draw our attention to previously neglected historical subjects. The history of the idea and practice of empire might help Americans understand why other countries sometimes resent our tendency to pursue our own interests as a world power while proclaiming that we embody universal values and goals. A recent Gallup poll revealed that few Americans have any knowledge of other countries' grievances against the United States. But the

benevolence of benevolent imperialism lies in the eye of the beholder. Indians and Mexicans did not desire to surrender their lands to the onward march of Jefferson's empire of liberty. Many Filipinos did not share President McKinley's judgment that they would be better off under American rule than as an independent nation. A study of the American history to the relationship with the rest of the world might enable us to find it less surprising that despite the wave of sympathy for the United States that followed September 11, there is widespread fear outside the United States borders, including among longtime allies in Europe, that the war on terrorism is motivated in part by the desire to impose a Pax Americana in a grossly unequal world.

Today, if one asks a man or woman in the street of America to define "freedom", he or she will soon mention the liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights freedom of expression, of the press, etc. Yet all patriotic upsurges run the risk of degenerating into a coercive drawing of boundaries between "loyal" Americans and those stigmatized as "aliens" and "traitors". Like other wars, the "war on terrorism" has raised troubling questions concerning civil liberties in wartime, the rights of non-citizens, and the ethnic boundaries of American freedom. It is not difficult to list the numerous and disturbing infringements on civil liberties that followed in the wake of September 11. To this date, not a single one has been charged with involvement in the events of 9/11. (Zaccarias Moussaoui, the so-called twentieth hijacker, was already in custody on that day.) An executive order authorized the holding of secret military tribunals for non-citizens deemed to have assisted terrorism, and the Justice Department has argued in court that even American citizens could be held indefinitely and not allowed to see a lawyer, once the government designates them "enemy combatants." Local situations and complex motives throughout the world cannot be subsumed into a single either/or dichotomy of friends and enemies of freedom or terrorists and their opponents. At a time when half the college history departments in America lack a faculty member capable of teaching the history of the Middle East, it is worth remembering that anti-Americanism in that part of the world is a recent phenomenon, not primordial hatred, and that it is not confined to Islamic fundamentalists but can be found among secular nationalists and democratic reformers. It is based primarily on American policies -- toward Israel, the Palestinians, oil supplies, the region's corrupt and authoritarian regimes, and, most recently, Iraq. It is not simply American freedom, but American power and its uses, that arouses international suspicion. It is not the role of historians to instruct our fellow citizens on how they should think about our turbulent world. But it is America's task to insist that the study of history should transcend boundaries rather than reinforcing or reproducing them. In the wake of September 11, it is all the more imperative that the history taught must be a candid appraisal of our own society's strengths and weaknesses, not simply an exercise in self-celebration but a conversation with the entire world, not a complacent dialogue with ourselves. If September 11 makes us think historically, not mythically about United States and its role in the world, then perhaps some good will have come out of that tragic event.

Kerem Bayraktaroglu, University of Exeter, UK

The portrayal of Muslim children in U.S cinema post 9/11

This paper will address an area of study which has little or no previous research history. It will outline the manner in which Hollywood has, since 1930s, portrayed white American children on the screen, by paying attention to the social and political reasons for the evolution of the portrayal. This historical evaluation establishes a base on which differences between the characterisation of a white American child and a Muslim youngster will become clearer. In the course of the analysis concepts and theories such as Orientalism, Transnationalism, Transculturalism, colonial gaze, diaspora, and hybridity will be utilised.

Data will consist of several post 9/11 productions, including *The Kite Runner* (2007), *Babel* (2006), *The Stoning of Soraya M* (2008), and *The Hurt Locker* (2008) in which Muslim minor characters play a significant part. Creative, technical and filmic instruments that are employed in these movies will be highlighted in order to provide an insight into the patterns that exist in the Muslim child's characterisation. Special attention will be paid to Muslim child as a resident in the US and Muslim child in the country of origin, a distinction which necessitates a reference to literature on migration on the one hand, and children at arms on the other. Where the projection of Muslim children differs from that of Hispanic or black youngsters, explanation will be provided, showing how the former's presentation is treated as either the end result of cultural fanaticism or the influence of hostile environment that the child lives in. It is hoped that the study will highlight the confusion in American cinema in presenting the Muslim youngster's identity quest, which is a natural stage in the coming of age for any child, with the same hostility directed in the films to Muslim adults with religious extremism traits.

Lenore Bell, University of Saint Andrews, UK

The literary treatment of domestic trauma caused by the 9-11 attacks

In this essay I explore the literary treatment of domestic trauma caused by the 9-11 attacks. I examine three novels by well-known American authors: *Falling Man* by Don DeLillo (2007), *The Good Life* by Jay McInerney (2006) and *A Disorder Peculiar to the Country* (2006) by Ken Kalfus. Despite the vast differences between these authors and the themes they usually tackle, their 9-11 novels taken together constitute their own sub-genre.

I initially selected these books because the Twin Towers were featured on the cover. They distinctly sell themselves as "9-11 novels." They all begin with a male protagonist crawling from the immediate wreckage of Ground Zero and staggering home to their dysfunctional families and all but estranged

wives. The marital breakdown that preceded the attacks continues to deepen afterwards. The families are all white, upper-middle class New Yorkers, who remain politically liberal throughout the novels.

In the early 2000s the New York literary landscape was dominated with tales of upper-middle class angst set against plush, materially comfortable settings. DeLillo and McInerney seem to stumble on in this tradition, hastily painting Ground Zero into the wallpaper. The characters in *The Good Life* and *Falling Man* are constructed as everymen and women. The narratives are split in alternating male and female perspectives. The characters are clearly meant to arouse our empathy and interest, yet fail to come across as fleshed-out characters.

I argue that Kalfus uses his 9-11 novel as an opportunity to upend the genre. *A Disorder...*, despite coming out around the same time as the other two, comes off as a hearty and effective spoof of the other two. I also want to explore some reasons why the authors chose previously ruptured families as the backdrop for their 9-11 novels.

Donald Bello Hutt, University of Valladolid, Spain

Kant, Habermas and Kelsen: Perpetual Peace as a contemporary debate

The 9/11 issues forced the international community to revise the concept of war and, by opposition, the idea of peace as a goal.

In Habermas's analysis of the Kantian project of cosmopolitan law¹, there is a strong critic on one specific issue: the moral – not institutional- *nexus* between states as a unique form of commitment to the perpetual peace project. This bound, considered as the condition of commitment, represents a difficulty to the accomplishment of the elimination of war. Habermas, as we do, considers that it is the institutionalization of International Law that must substitute such moral commitment, proposing different alternatives to update the Kantian project to the current situation of International Law.

The communication pretends to show how Habermas's redefinition of the Kantian project of perpetual peace remains weak in one particular aspect: the judicial system. Hence we have in consideration Kelsen's proposal in "Peace through Law"². Here Kelsen defends the legal – and not only the moral – character of International Law considering it as the ultimate point of validity of each country's internal normative system. To us, this manner of conceiving legal systems leads to an empowerment of International Courts of Law, forcing each internal Court to solve internal affairs according to

¹ Habermas, Jürgen. *Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace: At Two Hundred Years' Historical Remove on The inclusion of the other. Studies in Political Theory*. Edited by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Second printing. 1999.

² Kelsen, Hans. *Peace through law*. Edited by University of North Carolina Press. Fifth printing. 2007.

precedents dictated by the firsts. This construction implies a direct connection between the internal normative systems and International Law and reintroduces the discussion on how strong should the principle of sovereignty be conceived, leading to complement Habermas's proposal of redefining the Kantian project of cosmopolitan law. The argument intends also to draw lines on how certain institutions such as extradition or the *res inter alias acta* principle on treaties, etc., could be redefined prioritizing the defense of Human Rights over States Sovereignty.

Cathy Bergin, University of Brighton, UK

September 11th and the limits of liberal humanism: *The Reluctant Fundamentalist*

This paper looks at the limitations of liberal responses to the events of September 11th 2001 through a critical reading of Mohsin Hamid's acclaimed 2007 novel *The Reluctant Fundamentalist*. The paper argues that the critical reception of this novel precisely delineates a hand-wringing moralism which displaces any serious attempt to account for anti-imperialist antagonism towards the West. Widely claimed as a novel which challenges and disturbs American narratives of 9/11, I argue that the novel is emblematic of a paradoxically romantic view of the US which flatters its reader, not least through its much lauded narrative structure and its focus on lost American innocence.

Manuel Bermúdez and Manuel Moyano, Universidad de Córdoba and Universidad de Granada, Spain

Bush and Obama's doctrines to face Islamic terrorism: An analysis through the political speeches

In the present paper we are dealing with the different roles that George W. Bush and Barack Obama have represented through their speeches. They are exerting their power and influence by means of their attitudes and processes of social communication and they are the key to the interaction between state, social groups and terrorist organizations. We are making a comparison between the different approaches that George W. Bush and Barack Obama have had to face the terrorist threat. We have at our disposal some interesting papers on Bush's doctrine against terrorism, some of them conclude that most of the political and academic speeches on "Islamic terrorism" are useless, intellectually arguable, and potentially damaging for the community relationship and, in practice, they can even be counterproductive for the purpose they have. On the other hand, we have not yet enough academic research on Obama's approach to terrorism. This is normal, considering that he has been president only for a short period (two and a half years), but we already have his speeches, some of them critically important for the issue we are dealing with. We have seen a shift from the "war metaphor" of

Bush's doctrine to the "legal reinforcement", "epidemiologic" and "reduction of the prejudice" metaphors of Obama's doctrine. We can characterize Bush's speeches like reactive, unilateral, Manichean, which tends to polarize groups rather than to reduce prejudice, and even messianic. On the other hand, Obama's doctrine can be described as multilateral, focus on prevention, conciliatory, trying to reinforce democratic values and to distinguish clearly between the potential enemy and Islamic communities. Both ways have strengths and weaknesses. There has been a clash between these doctrines and a big part of the political agenda is highly determined by them. This analysis can shed more light on this important issue.

Daniel Broudy and Peter Simpson, Okinawa University, Japan

Causes and consequences of 9/11: Some perspectives from Okinawa

The absurd spectacle of a legion of Japanese police patrolling the fence lines around US bases throughout Okinawa immediately after the events of September 11 2001 provides the backdrop for this presentation.

Taking for granted the assumption that the world's most sophisticated military force, along with its extensive surveillance infrastructure, should have been able to fend for itself in such circumstances, we would like to explore other possible motives for this Japanese police "intervention."

These will include, but are not limited to, how the events of 11 September have been used by successive Japanese governments to reinforce a discourse that asserts a mutual "obligation" to protect the US military presence in Okinawa.

Through two case studies, we also aim to show how this "obligation" has – before and since – taken on a life of its own, and one which takes precedence over Japanese law.

In the first case, we examine the helicopter crash into Okinawa International University on 13 August 2004, the sundry illegalities which accompanied the US response, and the failure (or unwillingness) of the Japanese government to implement its own laws with regard to the limits of the Status of Forces Agreement.

In the second, we consider the legality (or otherwise) of the so-called "relocation" of the air base next to which the crash occurred to northern Okinawa, and the ongoing struggle against the construction of new US military facilities in northern Okinawa, in violation of both US and Japanese environmental law.

Beyond presenting these perspectives and drawing attention to ongoing legal issues relating to the US presence in Okinawa, we also hope to take this opportunity to seek advice as to how Japanese and

international law could and should be used to continue the struggle against military colonialism and oppression.

Nicole Darat Guerra, Universidad de Valladolid, Spain

The violent limit of democracy

Before 11/9 terrorism barely occupied philosophy, it could be said that it was a minor subject in comparison to that greater of violence. After this date the landscape changed dramatically, becoming thus, one of the most important objects of philosophical reflection. Violence, as we just said, has always been a matter for philosophy, which has always wondered about the inevitable relation between it and politics. Nevertheless, the more and more pervasive discursive ethics has pose the counter supposition, the illusion maybe, of the opposition between politics and violence, understanding the specificity of former as the dialogical reasoning instead of the use of violence. However, terrorism and the reaction to it in preventive war seem to challenge these optimistic beliefs and make us wonder once again can democratic politics do without violence?

From the perspective of non ideal theory democratic states wish to live in a world where everyone accepts and follow the law of people, but it is not about a merely altruistic wish of seeing democracy, as something good in itself, spread around the orb but a need of the democratic states, more precisely of the liberal democratic states, to preserve its own subsistence trough the expansion of democracy in the so called *criminal states* which represent a constant threat to them. War on terrorism, as a war against states which harbor terrorism, appears as a strategy for the conservation of democracy the last resort to violence to preserve the non violence promise. The aim of this work is to explore if this contradiction is unavoidable or if war is merely a phase in the democratization of the world.

Mark Devenney, University of Brighton, UK

Bombing for life: Reimagining the 'suicide bomber'

The past decade 'war on terror' was imagined through fear of one key figure: the irrational, religious fanatic, willing to sacrifice his/her life, while killing others in the name of a political cause. This article challenges standard interpretations of human bombing, reading this figure as a social symptom, rather than an as an irrational outburst against modernity. Taking its cue from the unlikely bedfellows Phillip Bobbit (2008), and Slavoj Zizek (1989), I contend that the human bomber performs an ironic reclamation of the self in this most radical act of destitution of self and of others. These acts are not

protests against freedom, but are protests against what freedom has come to mean- the freedom to dispose of life and of lives in a market place and the radical division of life chances that structure the global polity. Understanding, as opposed to explaining, these seemingly irrational acts requires situating them in relation to dominant discursive imaginaries, in particular the capturing of life that is the core of actuarial politics. This is not simply about the extension of the free market in goods and commodities, but concerns the capitalisation of life itself, through discourses and technologies which account for every aspect of lives, and which accord value to life through a seemingly neutral calculus. In this light the human bomber's act is not without reason, even if unreasonable. If the human bomber is a figure of fear, this article concludes by refiguring this fear as the expression of desire, a desire without possible object in the current political imaginary.

Hellen Fissihai and Cody Ward, University of Texas at Arlington, USA

American Devolution: How the tradition of negative rights in the U.S. has been altered in a post 9/11 world

The central ideas in this study focus on the values that make America a unique nation among other nations and will show how these principles have affected the world in a pre and post 9/11 period. This study uses classical and contemporary political theory to support the ways in which American democracy has changed both in its original and modern intent. It will present an analysis in how the United States has used its unique ideology and undertones of exceptionalism to justify its actions – both in domestic and foreign policy – that have often contradicted the ideals that the forefathers of the nation expressed during the founding period. The premise of this article seeks to analyze the contradictions of American foreign policy pre and post crisis, in which case, U.S. diplomatic decision making has ultimately pre-empted a new and deliberate resurgence against basic U.S. civil liberties under the guise of democracy. The empirical evidence that we will use to support our theory will be taken from the foundational piece of legislation (The Bill of Rights) and the modern piece of legislation (USA PATRIOT Act). We will present the ways in which the latter serves as the cornerstone for contemporary interpretations of the former. And, in presenting the aforementioned evidence we intend to build on the existing paradigm that the United States is not as exceptional as it has been or that it claims to be.

James Gallant, Elms College, USA

Personal grief and public mourning in post 9/11 American drama

The persistent memory of 9/11, especially in terms of mourning and grief, dominates American theatre in the dark first decade of the 21st century. In plays such as Anne Nelson's *The Guys*, Christopher Shinn's *Dying City*, and Neil LaBute's *The Mercy Seat*, the shock and pain of personal grief is clearly connected to the national mourning for the losses of 9/11. My paper will focus on *The Mercy Seat*, which, as LaBute says, "examines the ground zero of relationships impacted by and viewed in the context of global terrorism." While focusing upon this work, I will also consider other plays, including *Rabbit Hole* and *August: Osage County*, which reveal how the impact of national grief affects the representation of personal grief and mourning in American theatre.

Tarik Kochi, University of Sussex, UK

The sorry state of critique: Agamben and the exception

In the decade following the bombings of the World Trade Centre and Pentagon in the USA in 2001, US domestic security and foreign policy has been analysed continuously and monotonously by many on the left who draw upon Giorgio Agamben's theory of the 'state of exception'. The times we now live in, we are told, are that of the 'exception'. The prison camp of Guantanamo bay is the best example of this era in which bodies are placed beyond the law. Sovereignty, life, law, politics, are all, seemingly, ruled by the exception. Endless articles tell us this.

In this paper I will get very grumpy, curse a little, and shake my head at the sorry state of critique and its capture by this academic trend or fetish. I will argue that while there are merits to such a line of thinking, the overwhelming tendency has been to reduce the complexity of the world to an explanation that has little more value than a cheap intellectual party trick.

Louise Lachapelle, Collège de Maisonneuve and Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada

Ground Zero (4): Between the Freedom Center and the Abu Ghraib Prison

This proposal is part of an ongoing critical study that analyzes the reconstruction process on the World Trade Center's site considered, in this context, to be an important expression of the United-States' cultural response to the events of September 11 2001. Undertaken as a series of articles linking the architectural design competitions, the planning and actual reconstruction, the cleansing of the site and its economy of waste, remains and other ruins, this analysis also focuses on collections of

artifacts associated with the events created by various museums, as well as on a body of artistic exhibitions.

Ground Zero (4): between the Freedom Center and the Abu Ghraib Prison will propose an exemplary case study based on the exclusion of the International Freedom Center (IFC) from the planned reconstruction. The IFC was the main component of the World Trade Center Memorial Cultural Complex featured in Daniel Libeskind's initial master plan. Following families' protests lead by Debra Burlingame, sister of a 9/11 victim (D. Burlingame, *Wall Street Journal*: 2005), "mourning and memory" have claimed "from art and culture" a distinctive and secured space in which to (re)produce the saving memory (and narrative) of a contemporary culture exposed to danger.

This paper will suggest that architecture on the WTC Site and a growing network of public collections, exhibitions, museums and memorials are also enclosing devices and domestic military strategies that contribute to recreating boundaries, whether the familiar domestic space or a "secured" national and symbolic periphery; the space of "safe" living. This "cultural security fence" will be considered in relation with other post-9/11 control mechanisms, offensive strategy and security measures, such as the *Homeland Security Department* and the *USA Patriot Act*.

Ground Zero (4): between the Freedom Center and Abu Ghraib Prison aims to explore the pervasive yet diffuse role of culture and especially of "big culture" in the convergence of powers that Naomi Klein identifies as corporatism in the rising disaster capitalism: "big business and big government combining their formidable powers to regulate and control the citizenry." (N. Klein, *The Shock Doctrine*: 2007).

David Lea, American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates

International law and world order: A game in which the object is to change the rules of the game

International relations has sometimes been viewed in terms of the game concept and international law in so far as it consists of alleged rules, could be regarded as the rules of the game of international relations, rules which nations are expected to observe as they go about the business of pursuing their interests. But the fact that the rules can be changed whether by explicit procedures as in municipal law or more implicit consensus seeking within international law means the rules, unlike those in an agonistic game, do not simply create the framework and parameters in which contestants seek to frustrate and outdo their competitors as they pursue their interests. In point of fact, strategies for changing and modifying the rules themselves also become a principal means by which the dominant contestants realize their objectives and satisfy their interests. This has long been evident most obviously with respect to municipal law, in which the work of well endowed lobbyists and special interests effectively influence legislators to pass, modify and amend laws to favor their interests, but

this is no less the case with international law as powerful national and international interests struggle to modify and amend the principles and rules that have defined international law. In international law evidences of changes driven by powerful interests include an emerging economic dimension and the erosion of the central principle of state sovereignty driven by the imperatives of the war on terror and the principle of humanitarian intervention. This paper provides a general account of these tendencies in international law and their relation to the policies of their principal agents.

Hung-chiung Li, National Taiwan University, Taiwan

Unsaving global salvation

As the exponentiation of the modernity project, globalization aims to redeem all ghosts by liberating and delivering the unrepresented into immediate presence in real time. This universal drive to save invalidates traditional dialectical opposition and engenders what Baudrillard dubbed “the integrated reality,” i.e., a perfect system that rids itself of all risks or events pertaining to the real. The price to be paid for complete reality is loss of the real, i.e., the part that resists *aletheia* or positivization. With the disappearance of this hard mass which provides reference for our sense of reality, reality itself becomes unreal in the global project of realizing or literalizing everything. In other words, in achieving absolute synthesis or synchronization, reality cancels itself out and turns into its own nondialectical opposite. The fact that the world is becoming real-time hence signifies that reality is in risk. This creates a vicious circle: the more the reality produced by the global system evolves, the more reality becomes shaky, the more we plead for securing the system, the more we lose our sense of reality and get insecure and panicked. . . . To short-circuit this maddening system, Rancière’s model of classical politics, which centers on liberating “the part of no-part,” is ineffective, for global salvation is marked with its power to positivize or represent everything. That is to say, if securitization reaches deep into the level of being, and if the war on terror is waged to protect life or living style, contemporary political act has to (de)ontologize politics. Resorting to theorists of globalization and biopolitics, including Baudrillard, Žižek, Agamben, and Nancy, this paper purports to address this political exigency in an attempt ultimately to answer the question: how not to be saved, or how to unsave the world.

Victoria Margree, University of Brighton, UK

The disappointments of the 9/11 novel

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks, a number of novelists responded with public hand-wringing about the capacity of fiction to respond to these events. V. S. Naipaul, Ian McEwan and Jay McInerney expressed the view that the attacks demanded fact and not fiction;

history and politics rather than literature. To be dealing with invented worlds at such a time felt like an indulgence, it was claimed. Nonetheless, within a few years many novelists – including McEwan and McInerney – had produced novels which directly addressed the events of 9/11.

The argument of this presentation will be two-fold. Firstly, I shall argue for the unique characteristics of literary fiction which make it invaluable as a mode of response to real-world events including those of September 11th 2001. Secondly, I shall claim that the majority of the fictions produced about 9/11 have failed to exploit this rich capacity of literature to allow us to engage critically with our world. The presentation will aim to provoke discussion about how we might understand this failure of the 9/11 novel.

Herjeet Marway, University of Birmingham, UK

Women as weapons of war

The 'feminine' is often used in the rhetoric of war (there is talk, for example, of defending one's land as though the nation were a woman, or moves to 'feminise' the enemy as a form of derision), but the '9/11' decade has added to another dimension of women and warfare; the female suicide bomber.

This paper considers the trend of female violence in conflict in the last decade, and the ways that both sides interpret female suicide bombers to suit their political ends. On one side, for example, such women are portrayed as victims of brutal terrorist regimes that have manipulated them, or as victims of repressive, 'uncivilised' cultures. On the other, female bombers are presented as unblemished and virtuous characters and as liberated warriors resisting the occupation of imperial powers. In both cases, such constructions legitimise the tactics of those fighting with the moral authority of 'peaceful' and 'good' women backing their respective causes.

Yet these narratives are problematic precisely because they rely on woman being 'peaceful' and 'good' when these are not essential characteristics she possesses, but are rather socially and politically constructed ones. When women do behave in a way that challenges these stereotypes, each side wants to capitalise on the 'abnormality' of her act but in a way that limits her agency to ensure that she is not a permanent transgression to her 'normal' gender. This paper argues that the '9/11' decade has, on the one hand, forced us to 'rethink reality' by addressing the fact that women too are politically violent actors, but that, on the other, such a proposition is too disquieting for most societies (no matter which side of the conflict they fall) and they continue to 'explain' violent women in a way that maintains broader gender norms.

Vivienne Matthies-Boon, University of Groningen, The Netherlands

Exporting democracy to the Middle East: Jurgen Habermas and the Neoconservatives

In his recent political writings, Habermas has opposed his cosmopolitan project to that of the Bushite neoconservatives. However, this article argues that in some respects Habermas's works come closer to the neoconservative agenda than he realises and that this poses a potential danger of its being appropriated by precisely the camp he opposes. These problems particularly come to the fore in his analysis of Islamic fundamentalism, democracy and the Middle East, but also in his recommendations concerning UN-based internationalism and his appeals to Woodrow Wilson. By tracking these problematic areas in Habermas's work, this paper argues that Habermas needs to engage in a more carefully articulated, concrete and empirical analysis if he is to avoid these problems.

Mark McGovern, Edge Hill University, UK

From criminalisation to extremism, *Plus Ça Change*: Ideology and the *Prevent* Strategy

The paper will critically examine the current British Government's position on the causes of political violence, 'terrorism' and 'extremism' as outlined in *Prevent III*; the recently updated British state strategy for the 'prevention of violent extremism'. At the core of the Government's argument is that 'an ideology of extremism', in and of itself, and allied to the supposed failed project of multiculturalism, is the fundamental driver of 'Islamist terrorism'. 'Preventing violent extremism' so the argument therefore goes, is concerned with preventing the spread of that ideology and 'intervening' where needed with those potentially vulnerable to its message.

Through an examination of the *Prevent* document itself the paper will seek to contest this perspective in three ways. First, to ask whether much of terminology and language employed in *Prevent*, of ideologies of 'extremism' and 'terrorism', has any real explanatory value. Second, to challenge the evidential base upon which that argument is made, some of the sources from which it is derived and the way such evidence is selectively interpreted. Third, to explore some comparisons and continuities, in this post-9/11 era, with pre-9/11 British state perspective on, and counterinsurgency strategy in, the North of Ireland. In essence I want to argue that, as 'criminalisation' in the North sought to depoliticize and decontextualise political violence, so the 'ideology of extremism' model explains little or nothing but rather obfuscates and excludes the role of grievance, injustice and state policymaking itself in engendering disaffection and opposition. Paradoxically, the role of state supporting right wing ideology and ideologues has been of no little significance in both cases.

Matthew Morgan, York University, UK

Transnational warfare and zero-level politics post-9/11

The practice of warfare has always been central to the organization of sovereign power and thus the manner in which states are conducting themselves in the War On Terror provides a useful framework through which to discover the present organization of sovereignty. Changes in methods of warfare, the manner in which territorial space is controlled, and the way in which sovereign power organizes itself are all linked together and cannot be examined in separation from one another. Each element in this connection is undergoing important changes. My analysis will attempt to trace these transformations within the context of the War on Terror.

To begin I will trace the shift from the national security state of the post-World War II era to the global security state of the post-September 11th world. Following this I will look at how the manner in which war is being conducted is undergoing drastic alterations. This process is being driven, by what some have argued is perhaps a more advanced organizational form of warfare, the insurgent network of al-Qaeda. This discussion will lead into the final section in which I will explore the ramifications that globalization, and the consequential decline in the importance of territory, has had in terms of politics. With the collapse of a bounded political formation encompassed by structure of the nation-state and the lack of a teleological end point to the violence of al-Qaeda, whose terrorist activities seem to be restricted to simply disrupting the circuits of a Western-led process of globalization, we are, I argue, experiencing a depoliticized zero level form of violence.

Pedro Moscoso Flores, University of Valladolid, Spain

The (im)possible mediation of terror: *media* governmentality and images of the sinister

This paper seeks to make problematic the implicit relationship between the images of 9/11 and videos regarding US military violence in Irak, recently made public by the international organization *Wikileaks*. The first aspect of the relationship would be the particularity surrounding the images, which interrupt the gapless continuity produced by contemporary organization of media information constituting different manifestations of an *event*, understood as the incapability to generate sense from what's occurring.

A second element regards the denomination of both events as *terrorist actions*. While the 9/11 events were almost immediately stated as "international terrorist", in the past days various conservative sectors have designated the Wikileaks filtrations as a platform for terrorism.

As a third aspect, we suggest that the compulsive repetition of images from 9/11 or, in the same

way, of Julian Assange, show an attempt to restore media *terror* caused by incomprehensible visual events. This could be related to the Freudian notion of *Das Unheimlich*, as something strangely familiar that face the subject to the terror of what he cannot grasp, that forces to cauterize the event through the composition of an evanescent and manipulative visual narrative.

In sum, contemporary media condition articulates itself with “war on terror”: it *makes us* see the familiar and it *makes us look* familiar, working as a *dispositif* that constitutes a mechanism of a *governmentalization* process over western population.

Inge Mutsaers, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands

***Infected* politics and the moral implications of immunological discourse: A redefinition of biological immunity as potential for political change**

Shortly after the dramatic events of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush framed his comments as follows “our nation has been put on notice: we are not *immune* from attack. We will take defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans”. Such a use of immunological notions on pivotal occasions is symptomatic of the fact that life and the struggle for its protection have become global politics’ only horizon of meaning. From the *politicization of the biological*, which began in late modernity, we now have, especially since 9/11, a similarly strong *biologization of the political*. There has always been *contagion* of concepts and ideas between biological science and politics, from (social) Darwinism in the 19th century now to the disciplines of virology and immunology and the corresponding contemporary immersion in immunological understanding and semantics. In this paper I will analyse this strong dynamic interaction between biological and political immunological discourse and its moral implications.

In politics immunological discourse is often used to reinforce the *Us* versus *Them* attitude. In the biological domain, however, the dichotomy (discrimination) between immune “Self” and “Other” is increasingly being questioned. Immunologists have begun to recognize that immunity is far more complicated than a defensive *army* against destructive *invaders*. Autoimmune diseases have alerted them to the ambiguities of immune selfhood. In biology it is recognized that the borders of the Self and identity of the Other are dynamic, inconstant, and often elusive. The atomistic defensive model that dominated immunology for over a century must now include accounts of *cooperative* and *tolerant* interactions (*ecological* immunology). On this reading, “immunity” may be a semantic trap that has confined our understanding of the immune system to only a narrow segment of its defensive functions. What are (or can be) the (moral) implications of this redefinition of biological immunity for political discourse?

J. Paul Narkunas, John Jay College of Criminal Justice/CUNY, USA

Lawfare and humanitarianism: Universal jurisdiction in the War on Terror

“Lawfare and Humanitarianism: Universal Jurisdiction in the War on Terror” will focus on the normalization of humanitarian interventions and “lawfare,” a process whereby war has become less an exception than the rule, and therefore is as much a strategic operation as a legal one. By identifying the cozy alliance of humanitarians, human rights defenders, and military lawyers in the War on Terror, I will explore in this presentation how an emerging humanitarianism could determine and police the limits of concepts of humanity. Specifically, the historical legacy of humanitarian law as war law and the normalization of humanitarian interventions has made the distinction between *jus ad bellum* (justifications for interventions) and *jus in bello* (laws while in combat) so interchangeable in the War on Terror that the very form of figuration of what is recognized as an enemy, a combatant, and a civilian worthy of protection increasingly operates through strategic rather than moral or ethical decisions. A danger further arises when civilizational and cultural discourses inform the moral and ethical claims for humanitarian interventions in the wake of 9/11, and affect the adjudication and policing of which humans will be granted human rights and who can be killed with impunity. Indeed, I will contend how human rights, through the deployment of humanitarian or just wars and marking the limits of international law for providing actual protections in the wake of 9/11, may police the human, thereby limiting the possibilities for imagining humans differently as political agents. My presentation will focus specifically on the neoliberalist reconfiguration of humans as *homo oeconomicus* that are deemed worthy of securing begun after 1945 but intensified after 2001, as well as arguments on Universal Jurisdiction by NGO’s, which unwittingly may facilitate this process.

Ken Neil, Glasgow School of Art, UK

Continuum of the unsayable and the unspeakable

This paper centres round two images which span the decade at issue: in one, US citizens witness the WTC attack; in the other, US executives witness the killing of Bin Laden. The first image contains a haunting and prescient representation of the *unsayable* and *unspeakable*, a version of which was to return so surprisingly and powerfully in the second image ten years later.

In interview with Giovanna Borradori in 2003, Jacques Derrida proposed that there exists a double trauma in acts of terror such as those now metonymically held within the designation ‘September 11’. The attack on the WTC and the Pentagon involved, firstly and most obviously, the traumatising of commonly held interpretations of US landmass invulnerability made real by the physical destruction of life and property. The second order of trauma comes more abstractly from a pathological inability to comprehend what the first trauma really means.

The nature of this inability – with its overlapping component parts of the politically *unsayable* and the philosophically *unspeakable* - is of interest in this paper.

In accordance with Derrida's first order of trauma, such acts of horrific physical destruction destroy a complacent present, which Chomskyites and others would seek to reconstitute in greater critical understanding of contemporary political affairs - thus political *unsayableness* would be superseded by discursive transparency.

But perhaps there is a more serious blockage in respect of the second order of trauma. Despite the fact that this year saw the realisation of George W's goal of the death of Bin Laden, what might be done to address the unspeakable lingering trauma of acts of terror such as 9/11 and of the unseen acts which follow, and, alongside improved political nous, what shifts might we need to effect in our philosophical purview to contend with a precarious world not governed by a filmic logic of finality?

Daniel O'Gorman, Royal Holloway, UK

'If only by inches': Fiction, trauma and 'trauma culture' since 9/11

In *Trauma Culture: The Politics of Terror and Loss in Media and Literature*, E. Ann Kaplan asks what can be done to salvage the singularity of traumatic representation in a culture that has become saturated with narratives of pain. Diverging from both the 'humanist' originators of trauma theory such as Cathy Caruth (who emphasised the "unspeakability" and "unrepresentability" of trauma'), and their critics, such as Ruth Leys (who, despite providing an insightful critique, 'does not offer anything in place of the theories she attacks'), Kaplan argues that the narrating of trauma need not only help achieve 'a certain "working through" for the victim', but 'may also [...] provide a kind of "sharing" that moves us forward, if only by inches'. In a reach toward the interdisciplinary, she goes on to argue that a 'more complex model' may be established through 'a return to how the brain functions in trauma'.

However, although Kaplan is right to attempt a realigning of theoretical emphasis from the traumatic 'event' by which it is triggered to the processes of 'dissociation' and 'transmission' through which it is perpetuated, in my view her model still does not quite go far enough. While a neuroscientific understanding of 'how the brain functions' is clearly vital to any meaningful understanding of trauma, it remains problematic in the way that – whether intentionally or not – it perpetuates an outmoded approach to narrative that comes close to reducing the act of reading to an attempt at textual 'decoding', or (at worst) diagnosis.

In this paper, I look at the ways in which authors of fiction, such as Paul Auster and Jonathan Lethem, have engaged with the collective trauma of 9/11. Building on Kaplan's concept of post-traumatic

'sharing', I argue that it is through its ability to *problematise* the reader's comprehension of the event that literature can most saliently contribute towards a 'shared' understanding of – and tentative progression beyond – both the trauma and 'trauma culture' of the 9/11 decade.

Krisztián Pósch, Loránd Eötvös University, Hungary

Rethinking ourselves: Societies coping with the threats related to minorities – The case of 9/11, Arab Americans and its implications

Although the effects of the events September 11, 2001 on the majority of the American society has been widely discussed, the changing state of minorities, who were innocently related to the terrorist attacks, especially Arab Americans, received relatively small attention. Through reviewing the existing social psychological literature, my paper presentation is intended to unfold how a threatened society which is in despair react against minorities which claimed to be responsible for its national tragedy. The changing media exposure, hate crimes, increased discrimination and their impact upon the affected minorities identity, well-being, self-perception and their ways of coping will be also discussed. Comparing the effects with the aftermath of the tragedy of Olaszliszka, which highlighted the issue of gypsies in the Hungarian society, the presentation will also offer a model, how societies cope with the threats related to their minorities.

Liz Powell, University of East Anglia, UK

Do you hear me?: Gender, ethnicity and the post-9/11 political voice in Thomas McCarthy's *The Visitor* (2007)

The post-9/11 era has been marked by highly charged cultural and political discourses surrounding issues of ethnicity and citizenship in the United States. The implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act in particular has sparked multiple debates about the preservation of civil liberties in the so-called Age of Terror. Central to these debates are the ways in which Arab and Muslim identities have been visibly politicised and targeted in the name of National Security; a process which, as this paper will show, is intensely gendered.

Interestingly, the film industry has largely failed to take up these issues and rigorously critique them. One of the few films to explicitly address post-9/11 racial politics is Thomas McCarthy's *The Visitor* and this paper will examine the extent to which this film transgresses dominant narratives of ethnicity, victimhood and agency within a specifically post-9/11 context.

I argue that *The Visitor* attempts to offer a counter-narrative to the dominant ideology by constructing a sympathetic, individual ethnic identity in the character of Tarek. In addition, I will illustrate the ways in which the film reveals the ubiquity of racism within the United States in contrast to the narratives of exceptional violence that most often appear in the broadcast media. This, I argue, places the viewer in a position of moral obligation that requires them to take responsibility for the society in which they live.

This paper will also demonstrate the ways in which *The Visitor* can be seen to participate in the dominant ideology by centralising its narrative on a figure of white male victimhood. Ultimately, then, I argue that the film is only able to highlight the problematic nature of post-9/11 politics, without providing a potential remedy for those problems: Its political voice is raised, only to fall silent again.

Paul Reynolds, Edge Hill University, UK

Eleven theses on Abu Ghraib: Understanding the ‘exceptional’

In this paper I want to explore the abuses, violence, torture and deaths at Abu Ghraib Prison and draw out some lessons through the structure of eleven theses:

1. Abu Ghraib was not about individual abuse – it was a product of systematised, politically contextualised and strategic approaches to contemporary warfare
2. Abu Ghraib had instrumental lines of legitimating and apologia in US military and political hierarchies, but its structural bias as a set of practices, values and attitudes would have been bias towards abuse even if there had been genuine attempts to curtail or eliminate it.
3. Abu Ghraib was not a contemporary phenomena, simply a contemporary manifestation of traditional imperialist strategies of using dehumanisation, racism and abuse to ‘other’ the ‘alien’
4. Abu Ghraib gives the lie to the notion of ‘Just War’ and to the notion of ‘Rules’ of War, not because it happened but because it is a structural feature of the nature of warfare and imperial power
5. Abu Ghraib is a product of the more direct and explicit commodification of warfare, where the body of the other becomes a trophy and possession as much as their oil
6. Abu Ghraib demonstrates the alienation and oppression central to the experience of soldiers/guards and prisoners/victims and perpetuates the activities which are intrinsic to exploitation but externalised ideologically to legitimate ‘justice’ in warfare.
7. Abu Ghraib photographic images are not the ‘pornography’ of aberrant individuals, it is a representation of warfare that appeals to both the storytelling of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ and the cinema of the grotesque that constitutes disarming and dehumanising the ‘other’

8. Abu Ghraib involved the extension and exaggeration of exercises of power, objectification and dehumanisation necessary to sustain the notion of 'white hats' and 'black hats' in warfare
9. Abu Ghraib was about the exercise of power, but its sexualised nature was deliberate and necessary in the embodied 'marking' of the other. The link between sex and violence was an essential one in the acts of torture and abuse
10. Abu Ghraib is iconic not for its presence, nor its practices, but its 'normalisation' in patterns of discourse of disgust and apologia
11. Abu Ghraib is still happening and will continue to happen – its elimination is directly tied to larger radical questions of re-structuring the nature of power, ownership and acquisition in contemporary societies. Marx might be of help here!

Eduardo Ribeiro, Universidade Fernando Pessoa, Portugal

From 'self-evident truths' to 'self-evident' lies: Rethinking individual rights in a post 9/11 world

As the first decade over the tragic 9/11 morning is closing, it is perhaps time to look back in search of possible answers for many questions that those troubled and uncertain times have brought to us.

Some dramatic events occurred in the last decades, often associated with some sort of a *fall* – the fall of the Berlin Wall, of the Soviet Empire, of the WTC towers, to mention but the most relevant ones – have projected their literal or metaphoric dust in many directions, and a substantial amount of that *dust* is still over our heads, our bodies, and our souls, making it difficult for everyone to see clearly what's going on and, therefore, which roads to follow.

One of the issues which have been raised since 9/11 is the one related with the scope, limits, or even the need for a temporary(?) limitation of individual rights.

In America, where from the outset of its path as an independent nation the language of rights – collective, corporate, individual – has always had a most prominent place in the nation's political thought, this sort of discussion is now, as in the past, one of the core issues facing the political agenda.

From the seemingly obvious 'self-evident' truths of the Declaration of Independence to what obviously seems to be a set of 'self-evident' lies of different kinds, which invade our present condition, we probably have more questions to ask than answers to give. Some of these questions could be related with the possible balance between rights and duties, of individuals or groups, in a time where moral standards are confronted with high levels of relativism; or whether the power we (think we) have to choose those who will govern us for a certain period of time is – or isn't – currently undermined by

other powers we do not choose nor have the means to control; or still, can conflicting perspectives be part of the solution rather than part of the problem in defining our rights today?

My paper seeks at helping in finding possible answers for the above questions, and more. That, I'm sure, is not the task of a single citizen, either in the US or elsewhere.

Sheldon Richmond, Independent Scholar, Canada

Open civilization: Towards the reconstruction of liberal theory

There is a little noticed internal inconsistency in liberal theory that though liberalism is designed in theory to protect the minority from the tyrannical dictates of the majority, the minority has the right to use violence in self-defence, and violence in any form including terrorism. My question is: can we reconstruct liberalism so that terrorism --even in the name of self-defence of a persecuted minority -- becomes unthinkable?

My argument depends on firstly modifying Karl Popper's theory of the Open Society such that civilization is recognized as having the necessary function of humanizing people. Popper following Freud looked upon civilization as a necessary evil as opposed to a necessary good. By turning the tables on Popper and Freud (a viewpoint inherited in current political theory and implicit even in Amartya Sen's recent brilliant work on justice, identity, and culture), one finds that the individual can only develop their humanity through life in Civilization. Secondly, I modify Mordecai Kaplan's notion of Civilizations as radically different in kind from each other in their plurality. Though Kaplan recognized that individuals could live in two or more Civilizations, he saw that as a problem. Rather, by modifying Kaplan's idea of Civilization as sub-sets of an over-arching hypothetical and purely abstract or conceptual World Civilization, we find that individuals can live in multiple Civilizations without conflict. This idea also expands and corrects Sen's theory that the diversely differing identities of individuals is the bottom line for liberal political liberal theory by reviving and reconstructing the idea of the universality of humanity as an achievement in and through life in the variety of civilizations that individuals choose to inhabit.

Though the bottom line for liberalism is the individual; the individual can only achieve their humanity by life in plural civilizations. Both the "the war of Civilizations" and "terrorism as a legitimate choice" are incoherent concepts for liberals because plural civilizations are merely sub-civilizations of Civilization.

Christina Rickli, University of Berne, Switzerland

Rethinking 'real' suffering: trauma and the sublime in American '9/11-fiction'

For an analysis of the growing corpus of 'trauma fiction' about the terrorist attacks of September 11, the majority of critics and theorists resort back to trauma theories developed in the 1990s without revising them. The aim of this presentation is to rethink trauma theory in order to account for why especially the mediation of 9/11 has been crucial for a sense of collective trauma. Furthermore, it will be discussed why fiction was assigned a central role in the cultural processing of the attacks. On the one hand, the mass media, especially television, framed or even staged the attacks as a trauma. On the other hand, a sense of trauma was instilled by the discrepancy between the evoked aesthetic category of the sublime in the footage and the reality of the attacks that implied that spectators were likewise targeted by the terrorist act. Marc Redfield's idea of a 'virtual trauma' is the sole American contribution concerned with 9/11's status as a media event. However, Redfield does not elaborate the role of fiction in the processing of the attacks. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the public turned to the written word in hope that writing might help digesting the traumatizing tendency of the media event. In order to counter the sublime aesthetics, 9/11-novels perform a retreat into the fetishized sphere of "Americanness" through a focus on domesticity. However, although the framing by the novel somewhat neutralizes the sublime aesthetic of 9/11, the text likewise draws from the fascination with the sublime power of the attacks. By consuming a fictionalized tale about 9/11, the reader is allowed to take distance from "real" trauma and to re-assess 9/11 through the category of the sublime.

Jacqueline Rothfus, University of Groningen, The Netherlands

Hanging around in suburbia: migration, security and care. Understanding normalizing power in professional relationships with Dutch Caribbeans, a Foucauldian and an action-network view

In the last decade the fear of marginal migrant-groups and the desire to control them, have grown. This strong urge to normalization however, also creates new counter forces.

In this research project an attempt will be made to open new ways of thinking about normalizing power, by combining empirical research and philosophical analysis. The research is inspired by methods used in empirical philosophy.

An attempt will be made to develop a more dynamic model of power, based on Foucault's work on normalizing power (1961, 1977, 2002). An exemplary situation has been chosen in which disciplinary strategies are used to normalize a group of deviant people: a multicultural suburb where a marginalized group of Caribbean immigrants lives together with people from different ethnic backgrounds. The local government and many professionals put a lot of effort in creating a sense of

security in the neighbourhood, by trying to normalize this group. Foucault provides tools for analyzing the way in which power operates in this situation. By analyzing serious speech acts in policy papers and social theories, the dominant normalizing 'discours' can be constructed. This does not explain however, how the Caribbean Dutch resist normalization and it does not explain the complex relation which has been found between the reality as described on paper and the reality when people meet on the street or in a consultancy. By analyzing interviews different coherent clusters of thoughts and activities have been found. They can be described as different 'logics' (Mol, 2006). In the professional approach of the Caribbeans a logic of security and a logic of care can be distinguished. By analyzing different empirical data from qualitative interviews and document analysis, the ways in which they collide, shift and overlap has been mapped. In this way a more dynamic description of power mechanisms is constructed, in which different concepts of 'normal' behaviour can exist.

Tom Smith, University of Hull, UK

The myth of radicalisation

The former head of MI5 Baroness Manningham-Buller became arguably the highest ranking member of the political and intelligence establishment to publicly admit that the Iraq war made us less safe, not more. Her admission will hardly surprise those who follow such issues; however her logic is scarily mistaken.

Her assessment may well be true, though quantifying the 'terror threat' is anything but an exact science, and it's a conclusion that the best thinking on *the jihad* would essentially endorse. If the streets of Britain are less safe today because of the war in Iraq, it is not because of the so called "radicalisation" effect the Government believes so whole heartedly in.

Unsurprisingly the British media continue to bite on the tasty radicalisation bait. The BBC reporting:

"She said the UK's participation in the March 2003 military action "*undoubtedly increased*" the level of terrorist threat. A year after the invasion, she said MI5 was "*swamped*" by leads about terrorist threats to the UK. "Our involvement in Iraq, for want of a better word, radicalised a whole generation of young people, some of them British citizens who saw our involvement in Iraq, on top of our involvement in Afghanistan, as being an attack on Islam," she said, before immediately correcting herself by adding "not a whole generation, a few among a generation". "What Iraq did was produce fresh impetus on people prepared to engage in terrorism," she said, adding that she could produce evidence to back this up. "*The Iraq war heightened the extremist view that the West was trying to bring down Islam. We gave Bin Laden his jihad.*"

The logic was repeated at almost every news outlet that day and in following days press.

"For want of a better word", never has a phrase been so inadequate.

So the rather fuzzy idea goes; angry young men in the back rooms of mosques, characteristically in deprived urban inner city London or Bradford, are radicalised by a corrupt an extreme ideology. Typically this radicalisation is done by corrupted Islamic preachers, or even scarier is the potential for 'remote radicalisation' of the angry young men at home in front of their Computer or TV screens.

Now, as it stands there is, and never has been, any evidence for such an effect or process. 'Radicalisation' has become a comfortable shorthand for an accepted notion that props up much from so the called intelligence industry, academic and commercial enterprises that label themselves Security Studies or alike.

The truth and logic behind Baroness Manningham-Bullers conclusion is not so simple and hardly as sexy for the headline writers. People are not *radicalised* in a Manchurian Candidate fashion, not least because such brainwashing remains beyond the boundaries of modern science. Neither is there a central radical ideology to be radicalized too. The works of Qutb and other 'extremists' or 'fundamentalists' are often as alien and prosaic to young British Muslims as they are to anyone else.

The term radicalisation and the ideas it engenders in the media serve to further alienate the 'jihadist' from the decent law abiding citizen. It helps us to disconnect them and their macabre actions from the everyday, because they have been 'radicalised'. The truth however lies in the everyday and mundane. *The jihad*, the defining conflict of a generation, needs to be described by those with the platform more accurately than the actions of a radicalised few.

Instead, *the jihad* is the rational choice of men and women, old and young, rich and poor, Muslim and non Muslim, who are connected to the actions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir and Palestine, not through some alien process of radicalisation and the workings of a shadowy network. But by a cerebral connection built on empathy and a sense of injustice for other human beings, for which the actions of a lunatic fringe constitute violence under the banner of jihad. Those without the inclination toward violence harbor their support in other less tangible fashions which comprise the groundswell for which the violent hope to represent and act for.

Tim Strahlendorf, University College London, UK

In what ways can assemblage theory explain the problem of the 'false negative'?

This paper looks specifically at the case of the 'Christmas Day bomber' Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and, in light of his case, attempts to reconcile micropolitical academia concerned with terrorist subjectivities and larger geopolitical conflicts and philosophical debates around the re-shaping of empire. The theoretical background of the essay is derived from Deleuze and Guattari's writings which criticise the relegation of social phenomena (e.g. "terrorism" in its current discursive form) to either the micro-psychological processes of the human mind or socio-economic macro-structures. This argument is further supported and developed by Manuel de Landa in his book on assemblage theory, elucidating and developing Deleuze and Guattari's theories. I also draw on Homi Bhabha and his writings on mimicry to explain how security technologies are essentially defied by the what I call the 'mimic man terrorist' and thus become a redundant means of securitisation, if only dramatically raising the ratio of false positives (e.g. Jean Charles Dementenez). Through the themes of becoming, affect and using assemblage theory, I point towards an inevitability of conflict which must take into account the multiple relations and complexity between socius and subjectivity, macro- and micropolitics; something which in current (almost exclusively western academy-dominated) anti-terrorism literatures has been conveniently dissociated and discarded in order to vilify the terrorist subject. The final aim in this essay, therefore, was to foster reconciliation between critical anti-terrorism and critical (anti)globalisation/geopolitical literatures.

Bradley Jay Strawser, University of Connecticut, USA

Terrorism and the moral equality of combatants

Since 9/11 there has been renewed scholarly interest in trying to define, understand, and grapple with the normative features of terrorism. Many accounts of terrorism focus on the aspect of intentionally targeting noncombatants as the singular characteristic of what separates acts of terrorism from other uses of force for political ends. Running concurrently to such work, the past few years has seen renewed scholarly engagement with the just-war tradition at large. The vast majority of the new approaches to just-war theory have been highly revisionist of the conventional view. One such approach is Jeff McMahan's approach which centres on the rejection of what is known as the moral equality of combatants. McMahan argues that without a just cause no war-fighter can behave justly in war regardless of whether or not they follow the rules of discrimination (that is, of not targeting noncombatants). In this paper I aim to explore how McMahan's rejection of the moral equality of combatants should weigh on the received view of the morality of terrorism. One criticism of McMahan's approach, for example, worries that his degreed approach to liability may open up the

door to a kind of total war wherein noncombatants could be considered properly liable for an unjust cause and, thus, legitimate targets of attack by a just force. If this is true, then it seems like it could sanction a kind of terrorism of the just. I argue that a rejection of the moral equality of combatants need not result in this *reductio* if we restrict liability attribution to evidence-relative blameworthiness combined with the strict requirements of necessity and narrow-proportionality. That is, a neo-just-war theory can be built that rejects the moral equality of combatants but does not do so at the cost of our most basic intuitions concerning terrorism.

Mar Rosàs Tosas, Pompeu Fabra University, Spain

September 11th, the war to terror and the strike of the Spanish air traffic controllers

It is often stated that the September 11th unleashed the so-called war to terror. A clearly Schmittian idea underlies this policy: when chaos threatens order, the Constitution allows the suspension of the law for its preservation. This mechanism that, according to Schmitt, is at work only during a state of exception, has become one of the foundations of current politics. Agamben goes as far as to claim that we now live in a permanent state of exception: it is impossible to distinguish between the inside and the outside of law.

How can we escape from this oppression? Is there any space beyond law? Are those who pretend to oppose law really outside of law? In other words, is a divine violence, in the Benjaminian sense, possible?

The aim of our paper will be to examine a recent example of such an intention: the strike carried out by the Spanish air traffic controllers. Was their aim to oppose the law successful? Or, by contrast, their action could not escape law, since it was also haunted by the perverse structure of the war to terror?

In our opinion, this case illustrates the complex ways in which law is at work even when it seems it is not. As a matter of fact, even if no concrete law is enforced, the “force of law” preserves its force. We will explore the different ways this happened on the aforementioned strike. The air traffic controllers opposed the law but, in doing so, created another law —they performed what Benjamin calls mythic violence. Concerning the government, it declared a “state of alarm” that allowed suspending the usual laws and behaving extraordinarily, but, in fact, not outside of the juridical order.

We will try to show that this case reveals all the difficulties that any attempt to put an end to the war to terror will find.

James E.R. Unsworth, Griffith University, Australia

Religion in Australian politics post-9/11

The discourse regarding the contemporary role of religion in Australian politics has been a vibrant one post-9/11. Many scholars have proclaimed and explained that religion has asserted a resurgent role in Australian politics since the attacks in the United States on the 11th September 2001.

God... [has been] confidently implicated in moves to prevent the dying from dying, deny gay couples equal rights with their straight neighbours, reinforce racial resentment and keep Muslim refugees at sea, lower Australia's abortion rate and taxes, impart 'values' and a sense of obligation to children and the unemployed and undermine trade unions. (Maddox, 2005:260)

This study, part of a PhD project, seeks to empirically test the hypothesis that religion has been resurgent in Australian politics post-9/11. Through a content analysis of the Hansard record of the Australian Federal Parliament over the last 20 years, this study confirms this hypothesis, finding that there has been a greater than 60% increase in the invocation of religiously connoted words in the 10 year post-9/11, as compared to the 10 year pre-9/11. This article provides analysis of these results, as a lead in to a discussion of the Australian case through the theoretical lens of the Terror Management and Tipping Point theories.

Mathijs van de Sande, Independent Scholar/CAPPE, The Netherlands

Security, prefiguration and resistance after 9/11

After 9/11, 'security' has been one of the central notions in political dispute all over the world. Repressive policy, violation of human rights, and war are being justified as necessary means to ensure 'security'.

Most post-9/11 alter-globalist and anti-war movements in Europe, however, did not manage to apply a conception of security of their own, but instead either neglected this central topic of discussion in global politics, or took refuge in a reactionary concept of security, which was more enthusiastically adopted before by (anti-globalist rather than alter-globalist) nationalist movements. Although in some of the theoretical analyses from the alter-globalist Left (Hardt/Negri), references to 'security' can be found in relation to Empire and/or biopower, most post-9/11 movements seem to lack an applicable understanding of 'security'.

In the practice of alter-globalist resistance movements in other parts of the world -notably in South America (Zapatistas in Mexico, Landless farmers in Brazil)- by contrast, security is a major issue,

though often framed in different terms, e.g. 'self-defense'. Protection of the 'self' or the own community goes hand in hand with a critical, reflexive construction of an alternative understanding and narrative of this 'self', and is therefore an inherent part of the emancipatory struggle in which the desired social, political and economical structures and practices are prefigured simultaneously.

Given that war and precariousness continue to be central problems for today's radical Left counter-movements in Europe, my claim is that 'security' must and can be reframed and applied as a central conception in the prefigurative practices of these movements. The aim of this contribution is to explore the possible applications of a radical Left notion of 'security', and to elaborate its relation with 'prefiguration' as another key-element on the agenda of revolutionary movements in the 21st century.

Evert van der Zweerde, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

Political virtues in a glocal world – a pointless concept?

One of the averting commonplaces that one could hear after "9/11" was: "Of course, nothing can ever justify those actions!" Before expressing any possible degree of understanding, let alone sympathy, a speaker would make sure that she or he was not engaging in any kind of legitimization of the attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon. What, however, are the presuppositions in such a reassuring utterance? How obvious are they? What can we learn from them?

In itself, the death of close to 3,000 "innocent civilians," however tragic in each of the cases, and however impressive as an event, is absolutely minimal as part of a "war". The judgment therefore presupposes *either* a total rejection of politically motivated violence, i.e. a position of pacifism or a position that limits politically motivated violence to *military* human targets, or it must assume any of the following principles: this was not a case of *war*, but of something else; if it was a case of war, it was a case of *unjust war*; if it was a case of *just war*, it was *disproportionate* violence.

There is at least one position, exemplified by 'Usama bin Laden, that claims that this *was* a case of proportionate violence in a just, defensive war. Who decides about this? Is there a "we" that, still in the middle of a "war on terror," can try to draw conclusions after 10 years of living in a world that "was never going to be the same again"? Is it possible to sketch outlines of something like a political ethos or a set of political virtues that can be sensibly proposed as a standard for, at least, our judgment (not to mention action)?

Phil Vellender, London South Bank University, UK

GOD and KING and LAW: Shelley's *Mask of Anarchy* and the legitimisation of terror

The great English radical poet, Percy Bysshe Shelley, wrote the poem *The Mask of Anarchy* in September, 1819 in response to the Peterloo Massacre of August that year when the Manchester yeomanry rioted and then cut down 11 out of an estimated 60,000 crowd that had peacefully assembled to demand reform in St. Peter's Fields in Manchester. Shelley first depicts a 'ghastly masquerade' – containing the Lord Chancellor, Eldon, the Home Secretary Sidmouth, and, most detested of all, the Foreign Secretary Castlereagh – and presents these well connected, richly rewarded servants of 'Anarchy' (by which Shelley actually meant 'tyranny') in a macabre 'orderly' procession, joyfully celebrating the murderous achievement of their class's very own paramilitaries. It is 'Anarchy', however, who dominates and the skeletal figure of Anarchy bestriding a death-white horse is revealed as the very embodiment of the all powerful *terrorist* state, cloaked in the 'legitimacy' born of having appropriated those three pillars of 1819 England's political order 'GOD and KING and LAW'. The 'order' Anarchy professes to uphold is, in effect, a Regency version of 'shock and awe' with a tiny, liberticide ruling class holding the new industrial working class to ransom in a constant state of siege.

The *Mask of Anarchy* has been called 'the greatest protest poem in the English language' (Holmes, 1992), however it will be argued here that it is much more than this. As Shelley gradually unveils his analysis of what is wrong with Regency society and elaborates his politics of civil disobedience as the means to confront and defeat unfettered *economic* tyranny, we can see, crucially, how powerfully the poem speaks to us in 2011 of today's anarchic, neo liberal state terror, the state's perverted notions of 'justice' and 'law and order' and of the strategies employed by the 'new world order' to thwart our aspirations to true freedom, equality and democracy. With his brilliant subversion of everyday terms, so often for taken granted, such as GOD and KING and LAW, Shelley's poetics provide just as powerful a means to challenge and rethink in a startlingly radical fashion the reality and legitimacy of the West's present day notions of 'freedom', 'democracy' and the war on 'terror' as they did the ideological basis of the Regency 'order' of his own time.

Amanda Watson, University of Ottawa, Canada

When the world stopped turning: Recolonizing history through the 'event-ness' of 9/11

Two weeks after U.S. President Obama declared Osama bin Laden killed by U.S. personnel, The New Yorker magazine marked the historical event with the banner on its May 16th issue reading, "After Bin Laden." U.S. American media coverage explicating the aftermath of Osama bin Laden's death adopted similarly temporal titles: the "Post-Bin Laden World," (New York Times, May 2nd, 2011) a

“Post-Bin Laden Cash Crunch” (Time Magazine, May 3rd, 2011), and, overtly demarcating a new historical period, the “Post-Bin Laden Era” (The Economist, May 5th, 2011). In American media, Osama bin Laden’s death became the bookend of a new historical period in American culture.

Returning to the past 10 years, widely and crudely known as the ‘post-9/11 era’, the following mixed media art project (entitled “September 10th”) and corresponding paper address the concept of ‘event-ness’ as it occurs in hindsight descriptions and depictions of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The art work critically represents ‘9/11’ as mapped in non-metric space and nonlinear time, juxtaposing the modernist notion of temporality as even and homogeneous with post-colonial temporal impressions that shift and multiply with cross-cultural reception. Suggesting that dividing time periods by events, as is commonplace in academia and politics, is a way of recolonizing history, this piece elucidates the gross misrepresentation of actors and processes surrounding the events of 9/11 and Osama bin Laden’s recent death. Relying on Jasbir Puar’s notion of ‘temporal qualifications,’ and both Puar and Sherene Razack’s use of ‘monstrosity,’ this piece asks how ‘event-ness’ facilitates the construction of fearful enemy, and suggests its future unpacking.

Till Werkmeister; Friedrich-Alexander-University at Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany

'Domestic Nation': The sentimental discourse of US-American novels about September 11th

My presentation focuses on the cultural work carried out by US-American novels about the terrorist attacks of September 11th and refers to six particularly relevant and widely-read texts: Joyce Maynard's *The Usual Rules* [2003], Jonathan Safran Foer's *Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close* [2005], Lynne Sharon Schwartz's *The Writing on the Wall* [2005], Jay McInerney's *The Good Life* [2006], John Updike's *Terrorist* [2006], and Don DeLillo's *Falling Man* [2007]. All these novels, I argue, are characterized by an extensive adaptation of generic conventions associated with classic sentimental fiction. Moreover, in line with 19th century sentimentalism these contemporary texts posit the institution of the (largely white middle class and hetero-normative) family and the values of domesticity as crucial means to overcome both individual and national crisis. This is manifest most explicitly in the basic plot structure common to the six novels, teleological and linear narratives of development that conclude in the (re-)consolidation of familial or quasi-familial union. Working with concepts and ideas developed by scholars like Ann Douglas [1977], Nina Baym [1978], Jane Tompkins [1985], Amy Kaplan [1998, 2003], and Lauren Berlant [1997, 2008] my talk explores and scrutinizes the political and ideological implications of this cultural phenomenon.

Martina Witt-Jauch, University of Goettingen, Germany

Heroes and villains in the media - buried specters and symbolic returns after 9/11

Since Ronald Reagan and George Shultz put the “evil scourge of terrorism” on the map as the “soul of our foreign policy” and thus ended Carter’s human rights crusade, there have been preferred accounts of how terrorism is only used as a weapon against democratic countries and that it necessitates the use of state power and violence despite the costs. Reactions by the media in the aftermath of the 9/11-attacks have once again confirmed this tension between vulnerability and immunity, between lessons learned from the confrontation of the unspeakable and the memorialization of the abstract occurrence.

As narration is ritualized in a myth-building political endeavor of friends versus foes, the portrayal of particular heroes and villains allows for the reader’s participation in a process of transitional identity-building and coming to terms with the buried and re-ascending specters of past terrors. Writing becomes a Deleuzian orientation, a compass for developing new affects, ethics, and fluid sensibilities that allows for re-composition of the self despite prevalent death and fears. It functions as a line of flight that traverses particular subjectivities and pushes centralized organizations to the limit. An eruptive event of such force as 9/11 generates a re-territorialization in which distinctions between ethics and societies can overcode or accelerate one another.

It is thus vital to explore questions of “outcome creation” as the means for setting moral standards as an afterthought or the didactic qualities of such published articles in relation to the destructive thought of supposedly surreal dangers. Death in contrast to symbolic returns becomes a model phenomenon of immobility and unorganized energy, wherein decomposed aspects of life or living bodies are enhanced and subsumed under new relations and new power. Immersing ourselves as readers and witnesses in the reiterated soulful tale of foreign policy post-9/11 shapes new histories out of the graphic abstraction of individual heroes and villains.

Lori Woods, Buffalo State College, USA

The effects of 9/11 on American literature revealed through the critical framework of Sigmund Freud, Edward Said, and Maurice Blanchot and the novels of Jonathan Safran Foer, John Updike, and Art Spiegelman

Major historical events have often led to new literary movements; September 11, 2001 is no exception. The events of 9/11 left an immense scar not only on the American landscape and psyche, but also the fundamental nature of 21st century literature. It is evident that literature is moving into a new period. Literature written after 9/11 reflects the difficulty that authors have in expressing the raw emotion and

horror of the events of that day, the problems with trying to understand what happened, and memorializing the events. Post-9/11 authors struggle with these issues in their work and they need to explore the reality of the events and their ability to portray them accurately. Art Spiegelman's *In the Shadow of No Towers*, Jonathan Safran Foer's *Extremely Loud & Incredibly Close*, and John Updike's *Terrorist*, are examples of the impact 9/11 had on literature. They all share common themes which are representative of this new period of literature: Aftermath Literature.

This literature shares themes with works written after WWI and WWII, but there are also different issues addressed in Aftermath literature. Themes addressed by the authors of Aftermath literature include, the writing of the disaster, paranoia and the perception of imminent doom, Middle Eastern culture, the uncanniness of everyday items, insecurity, the realization that terrorist attacks are not relegated to one specific country/group of people, and a realization of America's vulnerability. Thus, post-9/11 literature takes a look at different themes in order to perhaps compartmentalize this event and try to make sense of it as well as help deal with the difficult aftermath of this disaster. This literature is worth studying in order to understand the world in which we now live, which is much different than on September 10, 2001.