The Battle for Spaces of Possibility within the Palestinian/Israeli Conflict: Healing fractures through the dialogue of everyday behaviour

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Abstract: Coming from a place that is so divided by geo-political conflict as Palestine/Israel, it is crucial to define one’s role as an architect. Choosing an ideology of practice in such circumstances is not a technical activity: rather, it becomes an ‘ethical’ approach as well as a political statement.

Unfortunately, the shifting political boundaries caused by the Israeli project of marginalization, continue to make the role of the Palestinian architect very difficult, with the result that clear agendas of resistance can soon be wiped away. The need to rethink architecture in Palestine thus calls for a new ideology, which overcomes the highly orchestrated matrix of Israeli occupation, and as such it forms the main focus for my research.

I aim to make visible the fractures that are created by Israeli occupation on the micro-scale yet are often overlooked by architects and planners. I will show how the current policy of hardening the border zones between Palestine/Israel brings not only division and destruction, but also produces new cultural and urban realities which are shaped by the act of occupation, and by the corresponding will to resist and survive. Perhaps the most outstanding outcomes of this reality are the everyday forms of Palestinian spatial resistance, which display creative tools that architecture and planning have so far failed to match.

I aim through a series of small-scale events -- which are derived primarily from my own experience of living there, as well as my site observations and social mapping -- to reveal how they contribute to the reproduction of space and are also able to cut to the very heart of the Israeli occupation strategy. These new facts are drawing lines for a new kind of thinking within architecture to subvert these spaces of pure oppression, and change them into spaces of possibility where Palestinian social life can be healed.

Introduction

This paper is part of my current PhD research in which I’m taking Palestine/Israel as my key testing ground, looking at the spaces between people, lines, documents and maps to search for the meaning of architecture of resistance. I’m looking for spaces of possibility that can empower the fragmented community and bridge the gap between their divided spaces, thereby working against the Israeli process of marginalization. The aim of my research is thus to re-draw a counter map away from oppression and fragmentation that can heal the fractures and rebuild the community. Above all, I hope to offer responsive design interventions that can engage with political and social realities and “move on from Koolhaas” creating a truly embedded and critical design practice.

For this purpose, my paper is divided into three main parts. The first is a brief introduction about Palestine and its vanishing landscape; the second part has its emphasis on the Oslo Peace Accord and the use of maps as tools of oppression and fragmentation; while the third part will look at the micro-scale of everyday events in Palestine/Israel, which are drawing the lines for a counter-map of empowerment.
Introducing Palestine and its troubled landscape

Unlike Meron Benvenisti, “who had wandered in a land with six dimensions: three for the Palestinians and three for the Israelis”\(^2\), I have never had to wonder who was the guest and who was the local inhabitant. Still, while trying to make sense of the surrealist map of Palestine/Israel today, formed and deformed by occupation, settlements, daily life and the will to survive, I hadn’t managed to draw the map of Palestine until very recently; my experience, however, has no confusing boundaries enforced by occupation, agreements, accords or resolutions.

Palestine has always been associated with 2 key historical moments, which have left a permanent landmark on its map: 1948 and 1967. In 1948, the British Mandate came to an end when Britain decided to withdraw in order for the Zionist project to take place, allowing Israel to be initiated as a national entity on what had up till then been Palestinian land. This sharp edge of Israel divided Palestine into before and after; it also began the crisis of the Palestinian Diaspora, and saw the introduction of a new map with over 400 Palestinian villages suddenly erased from it. The war on the indigenous Palestinians did not end there, and can be said to have actually started with an ongoing Zionist agenda to wipe Palestine from the face of the map and replace it with the idea of a “Greater Israel”. This led later to the 1967 conflict (known colloquially as the ‘Six Days War’) with Egypt and other Arab nations. Following its military success, Israel then proceeded to occupy the rest of Palestine (West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem), along with some strategic parts of Egypt and Syria. As a result, even more refugees were forced into exile and all of Palestine was now effectively under the occupation of Israel.

This ongoing accumulation of military oppression and land confiscation continued until it later erupted into the first Palestinian uprising in 1987, known as the first Intifada – in Arabic, this term means ‘shaking off’ one’s oppressor. The Intifada with its organized resistance was the reason for international calls for a peace agreement to end the worst aspects of Israel occupation, and led to the famous Oslo Peace Accord in 1993. The Oslo agreement was thus the main political outcome of the Intifada, and it has in effect enforced a new map of division onto Palestinians.

With the intensification of the Israeli strategy of occupation and segregation over the last decade, borders on the map have become more or less irrelevant. Palestine has now become associated largely with issues of restricted mobility and temporal dislocation. Some lines have hardened further still, such as through the erection of the much-criticized ‘apartheid wall’ inside the West Bank, which divides Palestinian people so brutally from their land. Today, the cold wind of change is ever more flattening the West Bank landscape on its surface, as well as invisibly shaping it underneath through a series of road tunnels, or with motorway bridges above, making it ever more difficult to understand or begin to draw on a map. Being conscious of one’s surroundings is now related to how many checkpoints we as Palestinians have to go through and how many alternative routes one can create to avoid these checkpoints; travel now is about going secretly through the valleys and olive terraces, passing by the villages, making up new stories to survive, and enjoying a two-wheel donkey-drawn carriage that can take us up to the top of the hill or down to the bottom of the valley.
Towards a fragmented geography: the broken promises of Oslo Accord

Maps have long played a basic role in identifying the type and scope of Israeli control over the Palestinian territory; being simultaneously included and excluded, the battle between Palestinians and Israelis has essentially been about the land. The 1993 Oslo Peace Accord was one such map-based agreement to set up a framework to somehow reconcile Palestinian/Israeli relations. Many Palestinians supported the agreement at the time, considering it to be an uplifting stage. However, other critics like Edward Said saw it as leading to a continuation of occupation “by remote control”, and predicted that it would prove to be the reason for a second uprising. This has indeed come to pass:

“The Intifada we are witnessing today is not against peace; it is against the very text and maps of the Oslo Agreements with all the oppression and inequality factors they contain and against the planners of the ‘peace process’ on both sides” 3

According to the terms of the Oslo agreement, as well as covering the situation in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank region was henceforth to be divided into three zones labeled as Areas A, B or C. There was to be complete control by the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Area A, compromising the major urban areas (i.e. the six cities in the West Bank); conversely, there was to be total Israeli control over Area C (including the Israeli settlements and bypass roads in the West Bank). There was then meant to be “joint responsibilities” in Area B, covering most of the villages and agricultural lands between the West Bank cities, which was intended to provide civilian Palestinian rule alongside Israeli security control. The thorny issues of what to do with Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, returning Palestinian refugees, and natural resources were left to a later stage, which of course never came to light.

The Oslo Peace Accord has been used ruthlessly by the Israeli Government to create points of connection and separation, as a tool to define the type, scope and “zoning” of control between Zionist ‘enclaves’. And unfortunately what the Palestinians have been given as a result of the Oslo Accord are a series broken promises and increasingly defined borders for areas which are surrounded by growing numbers of Israeli settlements and bypass roads. This division plan implemented by Israel is still under execution today, and if anything conditions are getting worse, since only the terms that might benefit the Israeli strategy of control and division ever happen. As Ariel Sharon said:

“Everybody has to move, run and grab as many hilltops as they can to enlarge the settlements because everything we take now will stay ours... Everything we don’t grab will go to them [Palestinian people].” 4

The number of new Israeli settlers in the West Bank region, according to a statistical report by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, has reached 483,453 people in 2007, against 2.2 million Palestinians in the area; other estimates put the number of settlers at about 380,000 people, but the scale is still remarkable. And according to B’Tselem, an Israeli human rights organization, while Israeli settlements currently occupy less than 2% of the West Bank in terms of their actual land area, even when including East Jerusalem, the structure of military control set up to protect them covers a total of 41.9 % of the territory, and they consume almost 50% of the region’s natural resources.

Thus the combination of the 1993 Oslo Accord, the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the security checkpoints, the bypass roads, and the building of the ‘apartheid wall’, has created even greater fragmentation and distortion within the Palestinian/Israeli landscape.
Not only are such measures dividing Palestine from Israel; they are actually dividing Palestine from Palestine, cities from villages, and preventing people from reaching their work or going to their schools and universities. The danger of Israeli occupation doesn't stop there; it lays even more in the associated invisible occupation strategies with their destructive and ongoing changes in everyday life. This is hence a danger from below and above, just as much as what can be observed on the surface.

Dialogue of resistance through everyday behaviour

The *First Intifada* drew its apparent victory from mass civil resistance against Israeli occupation – by boycotting Israeli goods, converting homes into ‘underground’ schools, refusing to pay taxes to Israel, mobile medical clinics, etc. – and this has left its own profound effect on the political and social structure of Palestinian society. As Karkar described it, it was the ‘lower social strata’ that took the responsibility of leading the *Intifada* through what was then called the United National Command. These united resistance groups ‘consciously’ avoided any calls for military action in order not to alienate ordinary Palestinian people. However, the collective role played by the local community and its leadership has disappeared over time due to the different political layers that have been enforced on them. Some have put the blame on the failure of the 1993 Oslo Accord to fulfill the needs of Palestinians, while others have blamed it on a lack of effective leadership and collective ideology within the newly established Palestinian Authority. In any case, the result has been a growing feeling of frustration amongst a Palestinian West Bank community which was now not only trapped in disconnected areas by the policy of Israeli occupation, but has also been left behind by Palestinian politics. As Hammami and other critics have noted, the loose structures of overwhelming military resistance by the PA has replaced the previous role of community groups, and has left the Palestinian people as a passive audience in the background.

Within the current situation of frustration and political conflict in the West Bank, the necessity to look for alternatives to rebuild the community and empower their role is becoming ever more crucial. Looking at problems from ‘below’ rather than ‘above’ is opening up new possibilities, especially when looking at the everyday life of ‘ordinary’ Palestinians. Today a series of small-scale events are contributing towards the social and spatial formation of the West Bank region, and can be seen as a new face for the ‘lost’ ideal of community resistance. Even though these new everyday practice might not be based on a ‘conscious’ political agenda or leadership, nonetheless they are transferring and developing individual attempts into collective forms of power that are able to create solid facts on ground, despite the obvious tensions being enforced on both sides of the West Bank borders. These actions could thus also be drawing the main lines for the new kind of alternative map that Edward Said called for:

“In the history of colonial invasion maps are always first drawn by the victors, since maps are instruments of conquest. Geography is therefore the art of war but can also
be the art of resistance, if there is a counter map and a counter strategy.\textsuperscript{7}

Image 2: Lines of oppression, spaces of possibility. (By Yara Sharif)

**The art of resistance: anywhere and everywhere**

Distance and time have become irrelevant phenomena in the West Bank during the last decade. Immobility has become a key tool in Israeli occupation: waiting to cross a checkpoint, walking through ‘no-drive’ zones, or spending hours to find a way to reach work or school, has become a central feature of Palestinian life. A journey that normally takes an hour is now taking up to four hours, if not a whole day. Palestine has become more associated with the checkpoints enforced on its citizens and the alternative routes that one has to look for or create in order to reach one’s destinations. Traveling now is more about the yellow Ford Transit vans, the four-wheel-drive carriages, the street vendors along the way, and the stories that one needs to make up in order to cross from one point to another.

“The orders are to let no one through today”, the Israeli soldier was shouting while I was dragging myself and my suitcases through the dusty checkpoint. I had to find my way out to Nablus. At the edge of the road, the drivers were shouting their destinations: “tora-bora, wadi elnar, elmoarajat”. Mine, however, is ‘tora-bora’ – no it is not in Afghanistan; it is actually the new agricultural route to get to the city of Nablus with its series of fantastic caves along the way.\textsuperscript{8}
Despite the difficulties and sheer despair experienced by Palestinians living under Israeli occupation, an enforced short drive or walk along some fields is in truth as much enjoyable as it also troubles the mind. It feels like one is running away from the madness of the occupation instead of facing it in every path we create or every checkpoint we avoid. These new alternative routes across the Palestinian suburbs and rural areas has become associated with memories and narratives: wadi elnar, or what is known as the 'valley of death', the impossible ‘roller coaster’ route where you can hardly climb up the hill, Tom and Jerry route and many others, started out as an individual attempts to proceed with one’s journey and have ended up being a form of collective experience and a lifestyle representing most Palestinians in the West Bank today. These are the ‘non-places’ being made by everyday experience into very real places.

In the face of such challenges, unemployed Palestinians have managed to introduce new social roles and possibilities whenever the need to find alternative routes has emerged; the landscape has since become jammed with a plethora of Transit vans – or the Fords, as every Palestinian familiarly refers to them – found at the edge of main roads and even in the middle of nowhere, waiting to pick up the desperate faces who haven’t managed to cross the Israeli checkpoints. Most of these vans are left-over supplies passed to the Palestinian Authority who had found them to be mechanically unreliable. It thus proved easy and relatively cheap for Palestinians to buy these second-hand vehicles with no registration fee. And as a result, Ford vans have turned into the main public transport system that Palestinians count on, and working out the alternative routes has become a new source of income for young drivers within a situation of limited job opportunities.

Operating in-between the West Bank cities has given these Ford van drivers a new-found source of power and authority; they have transformed themselves fairly quickly into an active network by which they can trade reports about Israeli checkpoints amongst themselves, or search for promising routes along the hills and valleys, or pick up and swap passengers, or above all organize themselves in order to assure the security of their career.
As the main form of transportation, and for many Palestinians the place in which one spends the most time, the flotilla of Ford vans now offers a much more important social role than simply confronting and passing Israeli roadblocks and barriers. Their drivers have managed to create new spatial qualities while trying to fulfill the emerging needs of passengers streaming through the dusty roads. With the collective journeys including different sectors of society it is meant that these groups have time to share political views and be involved in creating new stories. The Transit van has slowly been turned into a living room, a ‘supermarket’, a stage and a mobile theatre where everybody can have their say. Kareem, being highly experienced in traversing the Ramallah/Hebron route, has gone a bit further in his plans to improve his income; not only does he now offer tea and coffee in his van every morning -- as do many other drivers around -- but with the complexities and dislocations created by the shifting border lines, he has decided to accommodate those stuck in-between checkpoints in his own van, as a temporary overnight residence if needs be. “An ambulance is not any better. It will be the best business in the coming few years,” Kareem told me. “I will try also to get another van for females as well. I am sure that in five years time everybody will be imitating me.”

With the ongoing system of segregation created by Israeli occupation, a whole culture has thus grown around the checkpoints and routes. Individual ‘experiments’ of negotiating space is turning over time into a collective act; the street vendors who have joined the pattern of the commuters along the check points and ‘no-drive’ zone are now taking over and reusing the left-over spaces. Hence a whole sequence of canteens selling sandwiches, fruit, drinks and even clothes and furniture has come to fill the urban voids. Porters also have joined in with
their wooden mobile three-wheel carts being used to earn their living; not only do they carry goods, but they also take patients, children and the elderly across the most difficult routes. Kalandia checkpoint has gained its new unofficial name, ‘the duty free’; where one can buy anything across the ‘no-drive’ zone at very cheap prices. This network has gradually turned into a rather good source of income, and thus has accumulated more porters who have now organized themselves to assure the safety of their businesses in face of high competition from other three-wheel wooden carts. Even though these porters appear and disappear with the sudden changes in political conditions and borderlines, it is nonetheless common to see them all over the West Bank; if not out there ‘on-site’, the peripheral streets in the historic urban centres of Hebron and Nablus are good indicators of the accumulating amount of porters waiting to pop out.

Not only on its margins, a city like Ramallah is constructing an attitude towards the intensification of Israeli border controls and the consequent frustration in Palestinian economic activities. Ramallah’s vegetable market today is hosting the waves of porters who has previously gone to work at the Kalandia checkpoint, but were later banned from there by Israeli forces. Those who left the market simply came back to Ramallah with their three-wheel carts and their relatives in the search for new job opportunities. They now occupy the streets so as to avoid the high license fee charged for stalls in the actual vegetable market. They are thus playing a cat-and-mouse game with Israeli soldiers at the checkpoints and with officials from the Palestinian Authority inside the cities.

Two-wheel donkey-driven ‘taxis’ – in effect, carts – have also appeared in a later stage to carry Palestinian people and their luggage on secret journeys around checkpoints. Even
though they have so far been limited to specific areas in the West Bank -- especially around Nablus -- these so-called al-bisat elsihry or ‘magic carpets’ have turned into a source of hope that can ‘fly’ over any perceived obstacle. With their imaginative stories, tales of heroic figures, and challenging symbols, the drivers have made the impossible easy to reach in the village of Burin: “no fear”, “Azeza”, “the Mercedes is at the other end”, are all written nicely on the bright yellow plastic covers of the carts, with colourful decorations to attract the few ‘shy’ pedestrians who would rather prefer to walk. With a piece of carpet laid on them for sitting and a big blue ‘evil eye’ or prayer beads hanging up to bless the route, one can now not avoid such experiences, giving up on twenty-first century vehicles completely, if given the choice.

Image 6: The Magic Carpet, Burin village. (Riwaq Photo Archive)
Image 7: With my suitcases on Surda checkpoint. (Photo by Majdi Hadid)

The constant movement of the West Bank borderlines implies continuous changes in the routes taken, and in the minds of their users as well; the village of Burin has suddenly been placed on the map, while the importance of other major cities has been eroded by the ‘apartheid wall’. What disappears at a given point simply pops up at another location. Today, the Howarra checkpoint near Nablus is repeating what was seen in Kalandia about five years ago, with the everyday dominating the margins, while Kalandia checkpoint no longer hold its famous “duty free” reputation (following the erection of the separation wall, Israeli soldiers banned any commuters or vendors in that area). Today, no more than four or five canteens stand there offering basic drinks and food for commuters. The residents of the nearby Kalandia refugee camp, who previously used to provide support, accommodation and food for commuters coming through the checkpoint, now offer different services to those men willing to risk a day with their carts; empty residential blocks along the road have been converted into storage spaces and rented out to store the carts, with the young men from the surrounding villages hanging around and waiting to find an opportunity for some manual work.

What is outstanding in this new-found border culture is the ‘silent’ and ‘invisible’ networks of communities that are working together just to survive and resist. Van drivers, refugee camp residents, commuters, porters and vendors each have a role, either as a host or a guide or organizer. They all share responsibilities in order to assure the sustainability of daily events and practices in these emerging places. Hammami, has shed a light on some of these networks which have emerged at Surda checkpoint when it separated Ramallah from Birzeit and the northern villages in 2001:

“…The checkpoint took men from the margins and allowed them a role that was fundamentally and publicly important for the entire society’s survival” ⁹
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The networks of communities are also taking part in more dramatic conditions in Jerusalem, where Palestinian residents aren’t allowed any building permits within the city boundaries and surrounding neighbourhoods. Their only ‘collective’ building activities can take place ‘illegally’ and mostly at night, albeit usually waiting for Israeli bulldozers to come in the morning and wipe them away again. The Kofor Akab neighbourhood offers another story whereby neighbours work hand-in-hand to manage a complicated lifestyle which involves being torn between being in Ramallah, yet falling within the Jerusalem municipality boundaries. The changes they are now making in their homes, parking spaces, domestic furniture and even their wardrobes and fridges, are all seen as means to empower their existence and relation with one another. With this subversive lifestyle, they overcome the instability and threat of being excluded from Jerusalem by Israeli legislation.

Rabbit holes within blurry boundaries

![Image 8: The invisible journey to cross to the other side. (By Yara Sharif)](image)

After the Second Intifada in late-2000 and the accumulation of even further political complications, the West Bank is today left with a major question mark and real confusion as to where its territory actually starts or ends. With Israeli attempts to divide Palestinians with what are in effect new mazes serving to exclude ‘us’ from ‘them’, it has now become very easy to get lost on the way or end up accidentally at the entrance to a forbidden Israeli settlement or at an oppressive checkpoint. As much as this is a serious obstacle for Palestinians, it has also lately become a source of potential, as people have familiarized themselves with new roads whereby they can connect to other parts of the West Bank or even sneak into ‘Israeli areas’ to look for work. Thus the new complicated system of roads created in the West Bank after the Oslo Accord, as much as it has created division and confusion, has also actually created more
overlapping points on the ground.

As noted previously, the West Bank today includes Palestinian villages, Israeli settlements and a network of bypass roads built exclusively for the purpose of connecting the Israeli settlements with each other and with Israel; hence, it is impossible for any ordinary Palestinian to move within such complicated lines without meeting up with unwelcome points. For the untrained eye, one sees so little there apart from the roads, dust and occasional settlements; however, Alaa’ and his friends refer to them as ‘rabbit holes’ which operate only because of their invisible power. These hiding points of whispers and secret movement are activated at night by local workers and young men who gather to look for job opportunities. At the beginning of every week, usually at two or three o’clock in the morning, they gather at agreed points and sneak through together to different areas in the West Bank, behind the ‘apartheid wall’, where the rest of the team will be waiting. Needing to move secretly between the different sides, where even the reception of mobile phones gets confused between Israeli and Palestinian networks, these ‘rabbit holes’ have even managed to create new methods of communication between people (saving money and assuring their invisibility). Because the border lines are very ‘elastic’, these points ended up being ephemeral given that they only emerge with the emergence of condition. I was lucky to join with Alaa’ and his friends in one of their ‘rabbit journeys’. Even though I couldn’t stay on for long – leaving after negotiating the sewage pipe part of the journey – I nonetheless managed to become one of the few ‘female rabbits’ ever to cross these amazing shadow landscapes under the darkness of night.

Invisibility, silence and subversion are thus gathering together to guarantee the sustainability of these invisible networks. They are contributing towards a new geography of ‘resistance’ wherein the sense of absence is introducing new potentials; every object and context – even if it’s a sewage pipe or the a blue ‘evil eye’ – becomes a possibility to survive and a tactic to resist. The exercise of the ‘invisible power’ -- which requires as Barnes argues, ignorance from one side and knowledge from the other -- is becoming crucial to sustain and negotiate space.

This can also be seen in recent events in the Gaza Strip, which by being turned by the Israeli forces into effectively an open-air prison had no other alternative to survive but to go underground; its network of tunnels has become the site for the new grocery store or pharmacy, or even the farm for animals. Not only that, but creativity has far exceeded the need in some cases: ‘VIP tunnels’ were the latest ‘achievement’ – that is, before the recent Israeli military onslaught in December 2008 when Gaza and its community were all but wiped away – in that they are wide and high enough so that one doesn’t need to bend while using them. The VIP tunnel also offers phone lines, electricity and the luxury of some sitting areas, coupled with ventilation systems along the way.
Playing with Israel’s imposed borderlines has created even new lines on the map. By putting together all of these micro-scale events, Palestine is no longer divided into the city and the village; it is also the edges, the in-between, the dead spaces, and urban voids in which people perform, wait, remember and resist. The intensification of the borderlines did not leave any other alternative but to occupy the margins which in turn gave a new spatial quality and intensity to the ‘dark points’ on the map. As Cupers and Marcus write:

“…These margins get their meaning through opposition rather than coherence. While they remain unnoticed to the majority, they become platforms for their temporary hosts and for unofficial activities” 11

Nonetheless, occupying these margins was never a formal strategy or tactic of ‘ordinary commuters’ or the Palestinian Authority, and thus the need to rethink the map today given these facts has become urgent. The ‘unconsciously’ emerging networks, the collective activities, the invisible and silent forms of resistance to overcome and adapt, are now transforming boundaries into ritual spaces in which Palestinians can reconstruct their social relationships on a daily basis. It is in fact re-drawing a ‘virtual’ map that can overcome oppression and the labyrinthine boundaries being enforced on Palestinians.
Towards an invisible counter-plan

Towards a strategy of ‘empowerment’ (By Yara Sharif)

If we return to the question of what can be the role of a Palestinian architect within these fragmented spaces, is it their job to criticize and renounce the idea of occupation? Or is it to accept the conditions and unequal maps already created by the Oslo Accord? Do they need to adapt their thinking to limitations of the current situation, or propose an alternative that envisages changes? What can the act of architectural resistance be in such circumstances? And does it have the same meaning as it would have had 20 or 60 years ago?

While searching among the various lines, documents and maps to find the possibility of a space without chains, it appears that neither the 1993 Oslo Accord, nor the current planning strategies envisaged by the Palestinian Authority, has managed to overcome Israeli occupation as much as the actions of Palestinian daily life has. There have of course always been alternatives to accepting the unequal forces of power. Given that “Power as such does not exist. What exists is a power relation” (Foucault 1979), then the counter-map lies in looking for such relationship. There is no doubt that mass organization gave every Palestinian a sense of empowerment during the First Intifada. Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari have referred to its profound effect in their book on that subject:

“This was a sharp psychological turnabout for a public that had discovered what it could do -- and how to exploit the enemy's weaknesses”12

The Intifada may not be the best answer today; far more important are the social relationship and collective processes that managed to empower every individual during the Intifada. What we need now is a strategy to put the Palestinian community back into the front line so that they can take over the act of resistance, and draw their own maps. If silence, invisibility and subversion are to be the key tools, then it is time for the Palestinian architect to nourish them with responsive design interventions. Israeli occupation mightn’t require the concepts of architecture in the way these have hitherto been imagined: instead, it suggests an architect-figure who can sustain social behaviour and facilitate the kinds of conditions that will create more of these silent invisible and subversive networks. The foundations are already there and overtaking the margins. All that is required is to re-draw the map so that it corresponds with the new matrix of the everyday.

As long as one doesn’t ever forget what ‘normal’ is, as long as one does not forget while enjoying the walk through the blossoming trees full of almonds and pomegranates, that the top of the hill is full of Israeli settlements – housing the occupiers who are the very reason behind this journey in the first place – then invisibility will eventually reach a point where there is no power to obstruct it. If this will to go on with daily life is viewed by some as giving up, or as
hiding away from reality, then I see it as reality itself. It offers the space of possibility to create a sense of energy and to accumulate power all across the West Bank; indeed, across Palestine as a whole.

Endnotes

1 Fraser M. (2007)
4 Ariel Sharon, Israeli Foreign Minister, addressing a meeting of militants from the extreme right-wing Tsomet Party, as reported in Agence France Presse, (15th November 1998)
5 Karkar S. (2007)
8 The above reflects my own experience while living in the West Bank.
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References: